Showing posts with label what could possibly go wrong?. Show all posts
Showing posts with label what could possibly go wrong?. Show all posts

Thursday, January 17, 2013

Laughable security (in SCADA)

I've been preaching about the lacking state of computer security in SCADA for years; that networks will not stay isolated, proprietary, and protected.

This post really sums it up. Here's another really scary one.

The solution, at a minimum, is to apply standard IT practices to your industrial processes. Better yet, consider your architecture holistically with "Defense in Depth" in mind. In any case, have all the experts represented, which includes your IT department.

We should be able to fix this without it getting to the point of regulation.

Friday, September 2, 2011

Interesting article - #1 ICS and SCADA Security Myth: Protection by Air Gap

Eric Byers of Tofino Security (they do SCADA security research and have a security appliance) discusses the concept of relying on air-gapping control networks for security. In a nutshell, a modern control network is unlikely to remain physically separated. Even if it is, malware can be introduced via removable media and the system is hard to keep updated and vulnerable to local (insider) attacks.

A system should be designed with security in mind and kept up to date. 

http://www.tofinosecurity.com/blog/1-ics-and-scada-security-myth-protection-air-gap


Friday, June 12, 2009

Is anyone buying this? Really...?

I stumbled across this article that, quite honestly, at first pissed me off. After a little reflection, I can only laugh. It reminds me of someone trying too hard to sell those $150, short gold plated digital Monster audio cables - Oxygen free or whatever. (If the engineer inside you doesn't laugh, then cry for the sake of the suckers, read on).

Maybe I read in to far, but I see snakeskin oil vendors grasping for air! The piece is an obvious response to Steve Hechtman's very different article on the same topic (hosted on Control Engineering) - he should be flattered. You see, the big vendors, GE Faunc in this case, but the exact same applies to Wonderware and Rockwell have been long committed to the concept of Historians, a glorified and expensive datalogger that includes, and is only meant to work with, a custom version of Microsoft SQL Server (of all product choices...). The problem is that now much cheaper products from companies like Inductive Automation and Software Toolbox can do a better job using any RDBMS (database) system. Being vendor-neutral, inexpensive add-on packages also do much better for things like trending, reporting, and data analysis. The biggest mistake of the current generation of Historian is that they tried to implement and include everything themselves - like making a giant Swiss Army knife with a spork, usb memory stick, and a wine glass. Now they're caught with their pants down, desperately scrambling to recovery their enourmous sunk costs (my favorite business term).

  • You're data is special and requires "plantwide historian" treatment...their example query “What was today’s hourly unit production average compared to where it was a year ago or two years ago?”. I won't even comment...
  • Your database needs to speak specialized industrial protocols (OPC) - There's separation of function by design and for a reason. Besides - this doesn't even make sense.
  • Faster speeds and higher data compression - no way! The historian is wasting CPU cycles in both directions, which obfuscates your data (can no longer use external applications), to do something better achieved by a RDBMS system that supports it.
  • Robust redundancy for high availability - is this a joke? Maybe Amazon.com should migrate their server farms over to GE-flavor SQL Server.
  • Enhanced data security - another losing battle for the historian. The white paper mentions SQL injection attacks - all platforms in question can use stored procedures, and are all subject to this sort of attack. When it comes to up to date patching, arguably the most common vulnerability, SCADA vendors have the absolute worst track record! IT keeps their servers patched as a matter of practice - they're typically afraid to touch the SCADA machines. Ultimately, the "do everything" approach provides many attack vectors.
I can't blame them for playing their hand. I just wonder - will anyone read this white paper and take it at face value?

Sunday, May 17, 2009

The Risks Digest

I stumbled upon the "Risks Digest - Forum On Risks To The Public In Computers And Related Systems" from another blog post. Some of the stories certainly made me laugh - I spent way too much time there!

Thursday, July 10, 2008

Top Ten Worst Uses for Windows

This Top Ten Worst Uses for Windows article is an interesting read. It shows the general outlook on control software that you're going to get from IT geeks - and a part of me totally agrees. I think that the author, while experienced in computer security, has absolutely no idea what he's talking about with the majority of his ten topics. It's about like waking up one morning and going to Asia, then reporting on how odd it is that everyone uses chopsticks. How dare they when metals exist - diners should simply cast a fork.

There are merits to his examples, but he's totally oblivious to the problems and available tools.
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/29644